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Alice laughed.  “There's no use trying,” she said: “one can’t believe impossible 
things.” 
  “I daresay you haven't had much practice,” said the Queen. “When I was your age, 
I always did it for half-an-hour a day. Why, sometimes I've believed as many as six 
impossible things before breakfast. …” (Carroll 1939 p.184) 
 
Abstract 
Uncertainty creates anxiety so attempts have been made to reduce it using 
mathematical techniques. In the electronics industry the very large quantities 
of devices processed have provided reliable statistics and the opportunity to 
employ statistical methods. However, in fields such as decision-making and 
risk assessment there are strong criticisms of the probability calculus that 
have been triggered by discrepancies between the analysis of experts and 
non-experts. A radically different alternative is to view risk assessment and 
decision-making as exercises in rhetoric centred on storytelling language 
games. And to see the risk assessors as part of a political network attempting 
to influence action. 
Uncertainty 
Greek legends are littered with episodes endured by victims of the contingencies of the 
world — contingencies attributed to volatile and angry or jealous gods. In Aeschylus’s 
tragedy, Agamemnon, the chorus tells of the vulnerability of people and the unruliness of 
the gods: 
“Things are as they are. 
What must happen, must happen. 
No offering, no tears 
Can turn aside the anger of the gods” (Aeschylus 1991 §70–80) 
People were unable to divine details of the plans of the gods and only had access to 
partial reports of what the gods intended. As the chorus asks, 
“Clytemnestra 
… 
Tell us what you can, 
As much as the gods allow.”(Aeschylus 1991 §80–100) 
Thus the legendary Greek people struggled in a climate of uncertainty. They saw omens, 
but could only speculate about their interpretation as when Calchas, the prophet, read 
foreboding into the killing of a pregnant hare and her unborn young (Aeschylus 1991 
§110–140). Such prophesies transform omens into mysterious stories then the legend’s 
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unfolding narrative resolves the mystery by replacing uncertainties by accounts of 
worldly events. 
 
An inability to construct an account of the future can become a debilitating pre-
occupation as people face an ‘intolerable torture of uncertainty’ (Orczy 1905 Chap.31) 
which grows into an obsession about imaginable dangers. Uncertainty is a feeling and a 
fount of anxiety that can also stir anticipation and promote excitement so ‘risk becomes as 
necessary as the dram to the drunkard’ (Eliot 1900 p.243) and ‘wonderful in retrospect’ 
(Chesterton 1927 p.281). Contingency can lead people to express ‘a fondness for risk’ 
and add piquancy. Thus, uncertainty, anxiety and its distractions Goldhaber 1997; 
Lanham 1994) generate social forces, which in political and domestic contexts can be 
deliberately manipulated to afford control.  
Control 
The Thirty Years War was a struggle for religious supremacy; it devastated Central 
Europe and set intellectuals on a quest for certainty and rational consensus (Toulmin 1990 
pp.89–117). Descartes, for instance, separated rational choice from causation while 
Liebniz sought a language to ‘reveal the reason in all things with the … certainty … 
hitherto possible only in arithmetic’ and to offer ‘mastery of … morals … according to an 
infallible method of calculation’ (Liebniz 1951) . Later Laplace reinforced these 
seventeenth century views so that ignorance of causes or of the state of the world could be 
portrayed as primary sources of uncertainty.(Laplace 1951) Engineered systems 
developed from scientific models, have sustained the view that ‘science … given enough 
information and powerful enough computers … could predict with certainty’. 
In this setting any political action that proceeds without a proper degree of knowledge 
looks reckless.  
 
Powerful criticisms have been launched against determinism that point out the unending 
regress arising from attempts to make predictions. Karl Popper exploited Gödel’s famous 
theorem to illustrate that solved problems simply ‘beget new and deeper problems’ 
(Popper 1982 p.162). Similarly the Nobel Laureate, Herbert Kroemer, concluded that his 
most important message is about the ‘Futility of predicting applications’ (Perry 2002) for 
a technology. 
Inevitably any prediction, even if based on perfect laws must be cut short. Wittgenstein 
expressed the consequences succinctly by writing ‘We just can’t investigate everything, 
and … we are forced to rest content with assumptions’ (Wittgenstein 1962 §343). 
Any analysis exploring prospective actions will be bounded, and based on assumptions 
about the situations in which action will be taken. Outside of these imagined situations 
and actions, the analysis may have nothing to say. The assumptions may be quite arbitrary 
but their explicitness simplifies and makes analysis feasible. 
A common strategy in engineering is to transform the bounds placed on the analysis into 
physical or social barriers that limit the scope for legitimate action. In electronics 
manufacture, atmospheric purity is regulated, positions of photographic masks are 
controlled and personnel are asked to follow rules, for example, about their clothing. 
Testing and rejection eliminate deviant materials and components.  
In a particular semiconductor plant a faulty etching tool caused the scrapping of nine 
hundred wafers. Afterwards the managers realised that their explanation of factory 
operations embraced assumptions that were not necessarily valid. Their response was to 
carry out routine checks to detect when their assumptions were breached so they had a 
warning of when faults might be introduced. (DePinto 1996) 
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The strategy is to externalise uncertainty, or ignorance, and physically, contractually or 
rhetorically set it outside the boundary of a project. It is an attempt to create an idealised 
deterministic system. But the necessary degree of control is not always acceptable or 
achievable, and a culture of blame then forms around unanticipated or uncontrollable 
uncertainties falling within the system boundary which are described as the results of 
ignorance or faulty reasoning. It was suggested, for example, that  ‘over-confidence and 
faulty reasoning caused the Three Mile Island and Chernobyl disasters’(Sutherland 1992 
p.252). 
 
Cities are archetypes of large technological systems, which are intended to protect people 
from the vagaries of the world. In the tragedy, Antigone, Creon, the king, treats his city 
metaphorically, as a ship that protects its voyagers from stormy seas. Creon sees the 
enforcement of rigid laws as the way in which the city will make progress, and he 
proclaims, 
Our city is a ship that steers us home. 
Strong laws will once again puff out her sails.(Donnellan 1999 p.28) 
But Antigone is a tragedy partly because Creon is enraged by disorderliness and measures 
everything in terms of loyalty to the city. 
Externalising the disorderly elements by killing or exiling the offenders is Creon’s only 
strategy for dealing with breaches of rules. He is unwilling to amend the laws or 
reinterpret them. Creon does not seem to recognise that a city encapsulates a tangle of 
relationships between individuals with different often conflicting, inconstant, inconsistent 
interests. Tragedy emerges from Creon’s impoverished view (Nussbaum 1996 p.60) and 
his grotesque ‘ambition to simplify and control the world’(Nussbaum 1996 p.53).  
Probability 
The probability calculus allows people to calculate distributions of possibilities and to 
derive statistics about populations of objects and events and yet admit to the 
unpredictability of individual events. Recourse to the probability calculus provides an 
illusion of determinism and causality by dealing in statistics and relationships between 
statistics. Physicists have confidentially adopted the mathematics of probability and treat 
‘the most fundamental microphysical processes’ as ‘probabilistic in nature’ (Paulos 1989 
p.134). Individual electrons or photons are assumed to be unpredictable while the 
outcomes of repeated experiments form an envelope of possibilities that can be calculated 
to an astonishing degree of precision and lend credibility to the use of probability to 
describe uncertainty. 
For one advocate, 
The only satisfactory description of uncertainty is probability (Lindley 1982) 
Maxwell emphasised the utility of probability when he wrote the ‘Calculus of 
Probabilities … is the only ‘Mathematics for Practical Men,’ (Maxwell 1850) . A ‘failure 
to use elementary probability theory and statistics’ is regarded as a contribution to 
‘human irrationality’ (Sutherland 1992 pp.320–321), consequently, an unwillingness to 
use the probability calculus appears misguided.  
David Hume(Hume 1748) presumed the mind anticipates ‘various possibilities’ and if 
several seem to lead to the same event then that event ‘begets … the sentiment of belief’ 
and will have an ‘advantage over’ those events that recur ‘less frequently to the mind’. 
This interpretation makes probability a measure of a ‘degree of belief’ (Bigün  1995; 
Aven & Pörn 1998)   and depends on what individuals imagine is possible. 
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Hume also assumed our knowledge of causes is gained through experience. But where 
similar causes generate different effects, all the effects must be considered ‘when we 
determine the probability of the event’. He offers as examples the uncertain effects of 
rhubarb and opium and concludes that confronted by a variety of effects ‘we … must 
assign to each of them a particular weight and authority, in proportion as we have found it 
to be more or less frequent’ 
Linking probability to the frequency of occurrence of events gives it an empirical basis 
and some people take the historical frequency as the measure of probability. Hume 
thought that we customarily ‘transfer the past to the future’ and therefore transfer 
experience of the frequency of particular consequences into our imaginings about the 
future. 
 
An attraction of probability theory is that it provides a calculus for combining 
probabilities and deriving statistics. Savage (1972) created a model for decision making 
that aggregated the product of probability of an outcome and the consequence of the 
outcome which has provided the basis for mathematical approaches to risk analysis(EPA 
1997 p.1; Palmer, Carlstrom & Woodward 2001). 
The point of calculating risk is to influence action. An agenda might be set. Speculate 
about actions; imagine situations in which action might occur; estimate the likelihood of 
each situation; work out the consequences of the actions; identify the preferred 
combination of likelihood and consequences; select, execute and monitor the preferred 
action. In other words, derive a model of what is intended to happen and attempt to 
control the circumstances so that the model remains valid. 
Electronics 
Because manufactured products rarely comply with their designer’s idealised 
descriptions, expectations are shaped to tolerate variations. Specifications are commonly 
expressed in statistical terms. A current specification, for instance, asks that 99.99% of a 
batch of semiconductor devices continues to function, over a period of ten years. (Alam, 
Weir & Silverman 2002) 
The semiconductor industry, which has operated for fifty years, produces wafers each 
containing dozens of chips and each chip containing perhaps millions of transistors. Such 
extensive experience builds trust in empirically corroborated theories. 
Broadly, defects are occasionally detected in individual circuits. But a single fault could 
have a myriad of causes. However, theoretical statistical relationships coupled with data 
from a number of circuits can identify likely causes of failure in the past or the future. 
For instance, the insulating layers in some transistors are around eight atoms in width and 
faults arise as various processes attack these layers. Theoretical and experimental work 
has shown that this type of failure operating at elevated voltages accumulate in a batch of 
transistors faster than with transistors operated at normal voltages. Thus statistics 
obtained from accelerated tests with a sample batch are extrapolated using theory to 
estimate the accumulation of long-term failures in normally operated transistors. (Alam, 
Weir & Silverman 2002)  
Crucially, the relationships embedded in such predictions are statistical, although 
explanations often retain the customary linguistic framework of causality. 
The rate of development of the electronics industry encourages others to adopt the same 
analytical techniques but extrapolation to other domains is not always feasible. Testing, 
especially destructive testing it is not always acceptable and dealing with batches rather 
than individuals especially where remedial action involves potentially damaging 
processes is often unacceptable.  
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Critique 
Subjective probability has had its critics; R.A. Fisher, the renowned statistician, wrote 
that it reduces probability to a measure of ‘[p]sychological tendencies’ and is 
consequentially ‘useless for scientific purposes’ (Fisher 1951). A subjective probability is 
just a compact way of expressing an opinion that has the appearance of a measurement. 
However, although some features of the scale of measurement are often described, many 
details are omitted. There are therefore few assurances that consistent values of subjective 
probability can be derived or calculated. In many situations people simply do not agree on 
the probability values to be assigned and consequently there are pleas for ‘rules’ that can 
help the analyst to assign the ‘right’ numerical values’(Aven & Pörn 1998) or for the 
‘calibration of expert’s assessments’ (Bigün 1995). 
The interpretation of probability as a frequency is also vulnerable since an imaginative 
leap of faith is required to use experience of frequencies as a guide to the future. With 
extensive experience, probability estimates might be considered to be reliable but with 
rare or imagined events accurate figures for frequency of occurrence cannot be derived 
from experience.  
In spite of the apparent rational basis for risk assessment it is reported that ‘there is no 
consensus on how the risk should be expressed and interpreted’(Aven & Pörn 1998). The 
primary constituent of risk calculations, probability, also lacks definition since 
‘[p]rofessional probabilists have long argued over what probability means’ (Cosmides & 
Tooby 1998). Researchers often assume probability is ‘immediately translatable into 
mathematical probability … however, probability has more than one meaning’ for 
example, non-specialists construe probability as ‘possibility, believability, 
credibility’(Hertwig 2000). 
Unfortunately, some commentators have also concluded ‘there is no rational way for 
choosing a particular probability measure’ (Cooke 1991 p.87) and besides ‘people do not 
appear to follow the calculus of chance or the statistical theory of prediction’(Kahneman 
& Tversky 1973) and as a result there is a difference between ‘human responses’ and the 
‘various models of decision making and rational judgement’(Stankovich 2001) .  
According to Stanovich and West, ‘people assess probabilities incorrectly, … they do not 
calibrate degrees of belief, they overproject their own opinions … and they display 
numerous other information processing biases’. People’s miscalculations have been 
blamed on ‘systematic irrationalities’, ‘processing mishaps’ or ‘computational 
limitations’(Stankovich 2001). Discrepancies in experiments may also be due to 
experimenters who are using ‘inappropriate norms’ (Vanas 2000) or put more bluntly, the 
wrong answers, or perhaps the blame is to be ‘put on the human mind, not the statistical 
model’(Gigerenzer 1991). Even the specialists will ‘make contradictory claims about 
which answer is normatively correct’(Cosmides & Tooby 1996). No conclusion can be 
drawn except that ‘different probabilistic theories, or different applications of the same 
theory to a situation, may produce different norms, and there is no universal law to dictate 
which one is right’ (Goodie & Williams 2001) .  
Carrying out a risk assessment requires time and effort and this inevitably means that it is 
impractical to adopt idealised models of reasoning. Indeed it is likely that a rational 
analysis of decision-making that takes into account bounds on resources would not 
impose the full rigour of probability theory on the decision maker. Todd and 
Gigerenzer(2000), for instance, propose a framework of simple and efficient heuristics 
that emphasise the value of simple yes or no decisions in making judgments. 
Conversations about risk are aimed at asserting which is the best course of action, thus 
questions of risk are ethical questions. Once risk analysis is exposed as a branch of ethics, 
it becomes clear that matters of risk are liable to controversy and demand a practical 
politics to resolve disputes in good time and not mathematics. 
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Difference 
In the course of taking a decision people are liable to disagree over which actions are 
feasible, what circumstances may pertain, the relative likelihood of these situations and 
the outcomes 
As a study has shown, there are differences in ‘risk perception’ between  ‘ethnic groups 
… for a variety of environmental, health, and technology-related issues’. The differences 
in ‘worldview’, for example, mean that even if people from different groups agree on the 
probabilities and outcomes, they are liable to disagree on how they are combined. 
(Palmer, Carlstrom & Woodward 2001) 
Views change. As Wittgenstein remarked, ‘At certain periods men find reasonable what 
at other periods they found unreasonable’(Wittgenstein 1969 §336). The dynamics of 
knowledge and language means people weighing up risk in different times and places will 
call upon different knowledge claims and are liable to disagree about what are acceptable 
choices. 
Experiences reveal possibilities. So it is unsurprising that the response to a researcher’s 
question: ‘How likely is it that you will be assaulted?’ was affected by ‘personal 
experiences …, accounts from friends and relatives … or graphic episodes reported by the 
news media’ (Kverno 2000). Familiarity, though, can make people callous. In the 
Threepenny Opera, Mr. Peachum says, 
‘…few things … stir men’s souls … but … after repeated use they lose their effect 
… Suppose , for instance, a man sees another man … with a stump for an arm; the 
first time he may … give him tenpence, … the second time … fivepence, and … a 
third time he’ll hand him over to the police’(Brecht 1994 p.95) 
Differences also occur between people situated in different roles; between, for example, 
decision-making bureaucrats and individuals affected by the decision. The bureaucrat 
may have an impoverished model of the affected people and may see individuals simply 
as objects in a category bounded in time. If the outcome is tragically, ‘loss of sight’ this 
may close the matter for the bureaucrat but it is far from the end of the matter for the 
victim. The bureaucrat may measure his success in terms of the aggregate effects of the 
planned actions however individuals will have different preoccupations from, for 
example, their insurers who seek ‘better data on probabilities’ in order to ‘reduce their 
chances of insolvency’(Moreau 2001).  
Bureaucrats may have access to assistants and technological aids and may use one of the 
‘many models of rational inference’ which assume the mind is boundless, but even the 
well-supported bureaucrat will be confronted by limitations. Nevertheless a rational 
theory may help to plan, execute and manage the decision-making, while a model of risk 
assessment that uses  ‘the laws of probability to describe or prescribe sound reasoning, 
judgement and decision making’ (Todd & Gigerenzer 2000) may be beyond the capacity 
and experience of an individual. Thus a scheme for the efficient organisation of a team of 
decision makers may not be relevant for an individual forming an opinion, and their 
different methods may lead them to different conclusions.  
In the process of performing a risk assessment categories are chosen, data is collected for 
people or objects fitting the category and statistics about the population is derived from 
the data. Engineers and scientists, it is reported, are trained to see probability as 
something that ‘exists — independent of the analyst’ (Aven & Pörn 1998) as a property of 
the thing being analysed. In this way the individual objects or people can become 
misleadingly stereotyped with the properties of the group. Statistics thus become a means 
of labelling existing categories rather than a means of characterising uncertainty and 
hence differences. This is convenient for those whose objects of interest are  
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communities and mass markets — people who describe themselves as manufacturers, 
service providers and public servants — but is liable to alienate individuals. 
Fiction 
Studies of rational and objective means of decision-making have largely demonstrated 
people’s tendency to provide subjective responses. Arguments based on quantitative 
assessments are not always influential and dramatists are well aware that people will 
often react in a disproportionate and individual way to threats. Within a framework of 
storytelling, the probability calculus and risk analysis techniques provide a severely 
limited way of compiling and telling stories that may nevertheless inculcate strong beliefs 
amongst experts but leave non-experts cold. 
When you talk about risk and probability you are saying, following Hume, that from your 
point of view there are many possible prospects.  The description that you might provide 
for each potential outcome is a fiction in which you appear as a character.  If a 
characterisation brings satisfaction, you may wish that the story was integral with 
accounts of you life. 
A fiction may offer a desirable outcome, while similar, derivative fictions may furnish 
unattractive outcomes. If the fictions are plausible alternatives then you cannot be sure 
which is the account that you might apply to your future experiences and you are 
uncertain about the stories that will prove relevant. Where there are alternatives and one 
of the stories has an undesirable outcome then people are inclined to refer to risks. When 
you are certain of an unpleasant outcome there is no risk only tragedy. Discussions about 
risk, therefore, are sustained by an anthology of stories with good and bad outcomes. 
When the little boy, ‘Aaron shrank back a little, and rubbed his head against his mother's 
shoulder, but still thought the piece of cake worth the risk of putting his hand out for 
it.’(Eliot 1885 p.83), he was facing the alternatives of having no cake, having cake, being 
punished and having the cake taken away with each option providing a potentially 
different narrative.  
The consequences and options are not always spelled out but presented in a schema for 
constructing a selection of fictions. An array of scenarios could, for example be derived 
from a sentence that says: ‘[b]ecause of the risk to the airplane’s digital flight control 
systems, some airlines have banned the use of personal computers with mice, because the 
mouse cables … emit potentially disturbing radiation’(Winer 1993 p178). 
You can construct or validate stories by exploiting a theory. This applies to the 
application of science, to literary formulae and to machines, which are embodiments of 
formulae or designs and which constrain the future. Theories, tradition and common sense 
impose constraints on what are considered to be legitimate stories and help you construct 
accounts that sometimes match memories of your experiences, but theories also help you 
create satisfying accounts caused only by an encounter with theory. Where the fiction is 
plausible and told with authority, you may come to believe that it is a potential account of 
events that you have yet to experience. 
With a theory you can project your stories into the future constructing for example a 
rhetorical pathway between an undesirable outcome and its causes. You might then act to 
change the world in order to validate the telling of a different story. There was a 
suggestion that ‘[c]omputers at banks … could be disrupted if the Dow Jones Industrial 
Average tops 10,000’ (Taylor 1998) and ‘their systems interpret it as 1,000 or 0,000’ 
(Kyte 1998). It is anticipated that ‘[t]his could prompt computers to launch programmes 
that would automatically sell their portfolios or make mistakes in their calculations’ 
(Taylor 1998). An obvious counter-action would be to reprogram the computers and thus 
validate a desirable alteration to the narrative. 
If a story augurs a good future then you might prefer to keep it secret while you act to 
secure your position as the beneficiary. 
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Novels often create tension by describing the unfortunate fate that could happen to their 
characters and offer prototypes of risk stories. Characters have faced ‘the risks of 
marriage’ (Eliot 1900 vol.I p.41) and have risked losing ‘egoism’(Eliot 1900 vol.II p.54), 
their ‘life alone upon the moor’(Doyle 1901–2 p.127), their ‘scientific reputations’(Doyle 
1919) or their ‘happiness’(Austen 1926 p.107). In these circumstances we find it 
appropriate to use the word risk although in the event no harm may befall the imagined 
victims. Embarrassment is an adverse feeling that Sherlock Holmes set against the reward 
of solving a crime, as he recounts 
“At the risk of becoming the laughing-stock of my own servant, I again slipped 
my key under the door, imprisoning myself for the night” (Doyle 1895 p.84) 
In each risk story, there must be particular actions that make particular options plausible 
so the outcomes in retrospect are seen to have a specific cause. Sherlock Holmes thought 
it best, for example, to risk a climb although the waterfall roared beneath him. He 
remarked, “A mistake would have been fatal”(Doyle 1903 p.367) so it is clear that his 
attempt to climb above the waterfall might have lead to his death. A presumption that Dr. 
Watson made and shocked on seeing Holmes said, “Is it possible that you succeeded in 
climbing out of that awful abyss?”(Doyle 1903 p.366)  
Advertisements present simplified risk anthologies. An American wartime advertisement 
by the Pullman Company shows a photograph of a family comfortably sitting at home. 
An accompanying picture shows a smiling young man on a train who is on an important 
war mission. Another pair of photos shows the family eagerly waiting with their suitcases 
to go on holiday followed by an image of a frustrated head of the household waiting with 
his family for a train back from his holiday who, the advertisement notes, will not be 
offered extra train services. The risk, a picture caption announces, is of being stranded 
(Pullman 1945). 
A tale with a good outcome implies the complementary story, which can go untold. A bad 
outcome is hinted at by the headline, ‘Don’t risk inferior TV’. The advertisement from 
1951 continues, ‘your safest buy is the TV of known quality’, that will give ‘long years of 
carefree pleasure’. You could according to the advertisement be ‘sure of costlier 
engineering’ and the resulting implied quality means ‘Long years of trouble-free 
performance’. These claims are supported by the information that ‘Zenith products have 
served their owners for 10-20 yeas or more’ (Zenith 1951). In this example the risk is that 
you could have an unreliable TV, but there is a course of action that the advertisement 
implies will obviate this.  
Language games 
Risk is embedded in language games that trigger action, apportion blame, or construct 
identities. These language games involve forming anthologies of stories (or schematic 
stories with an implied collection of endings). Crucially in risk games stories are accounts 
of the future. 
Bravado, which can help to construct identity, can cross the boundary between creating 
fictions and lying — creating a fiction that the blusterer finds implausible.  
Risk games, including those intended to apportion blame, must securely identify people 
or groups of people with events in the their stories. Characters in a story are individuals 
and each is treated differently from the others. People may agree on the stories to be told 
but identify with different characters and thus prefer only the versions of the risk stories 
in which their character benefits. People identifying themselves with potential victims 
will see things differently from those who see themselves as decision makers or those 
who see themselves as experimental subjects. 
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Risk games that are intended to trigger action have to incorporate convincing stories and 
moves that seek to establish authority. The authority of story can be enhanced, for 
instance, by supportive reports from third parties perhaps triggered by incidental events or 
parallel actions deliberately taken to make the risk stories credible. Authority is signalled 
in part by the way in which the story is presented including the choice of language. The 
probability calculus has a role in presentations to audiences that accept the authority 
provided by a scientific style. 
The risk, revealed in a deodorant advertisement, of anxiety and embarrassment can be 
avoided by ‘taking a minute to dust on Deodo’. This particular advertisement gained 
some authority because it was presented in the same style as the magazine articles. 
Additionally, it names the author (Deodo 1926), who lent her weight to the standing of 
the advertisement.  
A succession of experiments that tested the effect of the phrasing of probabilistic 
problems showed that rewording problems in terms of frequency of events rather than 
probability radically altered the solutions that people gave. Small modifications such as 
the replacement of percentages by numbers in a population also altered the results 
(Cosmides & Tooby 1996). Another study noted that ‘virtually all participants’ were only 
able to solve the problem set when probabilities were represented as chances (Girotto 
2002). A particular phrasing of questions can therefore lead a majority towards a 
particular conclusion although to an expert the different formulations may seem 
equivalent. 
A researcher tacitly acknowledged that the choice of terms can trigger different emotional 
reactions when he distinguished ‘physically threatening’ and ‘neutral’ words (Kverno 
2000). And just as the novel about Dr. Frankenstein promoted fears about technological 
developments so phrases like ‘Frankenstein foods’ (Lewis 2002) heighten, or at least 
popularise fears. Particular technical terms have a history that also carries a rhetorical 
force. For example dioxins, ‘implicated in war’ gained a reputation after the Seveso 
incident as ‘invisible’ agents that poisoned and propagated ‘like a dread disease’  
(DeMarchi & Jerome 1999). Accordingly, mention of dioxins, even as a simile (Atthakor 
2002), brings a sense of danger and dread to a text. 
One study concludes that ‘some common warning words are not well understood’ and 
although ‘standards … recommend … that ‘Danger’, ‘Warning’ and ‘Caution’ are used to 
denote decreasing levels of hazard’ the study showed that the interpretation of these 
words by fifteen to twenty year olds is different from other age groups (Hellier 2000). 
Thus a story exploiting these words would affect one age group differently from another.
Some of the reported anomalous results of studies can be accounted for by recognising 
that participants in psychological experiments are playing different kinds of language 
games from those who are concerned with risk. Also the logic problems set by 
experimenters ‘typically require one to ignore vast amounts of real-world knowledge to 
focus entirely on abstractions’ (DeKay, Haselton & Kirkpatrick 2001), and experimental 
subjects, unfamiliar with the researcher’s logic game is likely treat the puzzle differently 
and thus surprise the researcher with their conclusions. (Tognetti 1999) A language game 
therefore needs a protocol to ensure that the participants are aware of the game that they 
are playing. 
Conclusion 
Risk is about events that might occur in the future. It is about choices and therefore about 
action. Changes following action are products of political activity. Risk games that 
provoke action are thus political tools, which can be honed for particular tasks by shrewd 
handling of language and skilled storytelling. 
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A risk game requires an anthology of stories that circulates amongst those to be 
influenced — those who are to act and those who might obstruct action. It is the role of 
the novel, the drama, the docudrama, the stories and advertisements in the newspapers 
and on television screens to present possible accounts of the future. That is they circulate 
risk stories and provide templates for new generations of stories. The stories might be 
fashioned by a political master or produced collaboratively. Actors have to be able to 
identify with characters in the stories and the stories must resonate with the actors beliefs 
about the world. 
Confusion and misunderstanding can be a product of risk stories including those that 
adopt a scientific style incorporating the probability calculus. This may be of value to less 
scrupulous politicians and hence risk games are not necessarily benign. Attempts to 
conquer uncertainty have sometimes become ways of oversimplifying the description of 
the world and thus creating excuses for tyranny. 
Probability theory has a place in situations where ample empirical data is available. It can 
also, in some circles, add authority to stories that are told. Formal risk assessment cannot 
eliminate the unexpected and does not prevent tragedies but it does provide a systematic 
way of building anthologies of risk stories which may not be comprehensive but are often 
extensive and do reveal some situations that might be better avoided. However the 
political repertoire of risk stories is much richer than those that mathematical probabilities 
inspire. 
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